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Abstract. We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the
choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling
can increase underwriters’ incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is
important for universal banks to enter the investment banking business; second, that cross-selling
is particularly attractive for highly leveraged borrowers; third, that less-than-market rates are no
prerequisite for cross-selling to benefit a bank’s clients. In our model, cross-selling reduces rents in
the underwriting business.
JEL Classification: G21, G24, D49
“Perhaps it was not such a bright idea to offer credit to investment-banking clients at less-
than-market rates—even though this has been a chief calling card over the past few years for
those commercial banks that wanted to get into the juicy business of investment banking. After
all, it is precisely the riskiest borrowers, those who have trouble borrowing elsewhere, that are
most likely to take up aspiring investment banks on their offers of credit.” (The Economist,
“Thanks a bundle,” August 24, 2002)
1. Introduction
For many years, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prevented commercial banks from
engaging in investment banking. But in the late 1980s the strict separation of the
financial services industry in the United States was relaxed, and in 1999 it was
finally repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act. This
development was much anticipated by those commercial banks that were eager to
enter the investment-banking business.
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Reports in the popular press, such as the Economist, suggest that the ability to
combine both lending and investment-banking services (cross-selling or combined
deals) is a main competitive weapon for universal banks and plays an important
role in winning investment-banking clients. Indeed, lending to investment bank-
ing clients seems to be widespread in practice. For example, Drucker and Puri
(2005) find that 20% of seasoned equity offerings in the first half of 2001 in-
volved a loan from the underwriter to the issuer. However, it is less clear why
debt is crucial for universal banks to enter the investment banking business. For
example, making the firm an attractive offer by providing debt at a less-than-
market rate cannot be the only benefit of debt as this could also be achieved by
offering attractive terms on the underwriting contract. Also, if universal banks
used their market power in the debt market to enter the underwriting business
through cross-selling, it is unclear, why they would offer debt at a less-than-market
rate.
Ouraiminthispaperistoexaminethebenefitofcombiningunderwritingservices
and lending and its implications for the choice of underwriters and for competition
in the underwriting business. We show that a potential benefit of cross-selling is
that the debt that universal banks provide increases their underwriting incentives,
which is beneficial in the presence of contracting problems in underwriting. The
analysis is based on informational economies of scope in lending and underwriting,
which are potentially very important in universal banking.
Informational economies of scope can lead directly to a potential cross-selling
benefit if a firm needs debt and equity and the cost of monitoring or building a
relation is lower when lending and underwriting are provided by the same financial
institution at the same point in time (e.g., Kanatas and Qi, 1998; Drucker and Puri,
2005). However, informational economies of scope are also important if a firm
needs bank credit after a failed attempt to issue securities and the universal bank
uses its information advantage to lend to the firm at later stages at a lower cost.
Kanatas and Qi (2003) show that this type of cost saving results in a rent for the
universal bank after a failed underwriting issue and therefore reduces its incentives
to exert underwriting effort. As a consequence, a firm may prefer a specialized
investment bank.
We focus on this negative incentive effect of a universal bank’s ability to provide
credit after a failed equity issue and discuss the role of cross-selling, where the
underwriteralsoprovidesinitialdebttogetherwiththeunderwritingservices.Cross-
selling can be important for the universal bank even if there is no cost saving of
combining initial debt and underwriting services and even if the initial debt in the
combined deal is correctly priced on a stand-alone basis. The benefit of initial debt
is that risky debt in combined deals increases effort incentives in underwriting. The
incentives stem from the negative effect of a failure of underwriting on the value of
the initial debt, which increases in the debt’s risk.CROSS-SELLING LENDING AND UNDERWRITING 343
Our analysis sheds light on two characteristics addressed in the Economist:
first, that cross-selling is important for universal banks to enter the invest-
ment banking business; second, that cross-selling is attractive for risky bor-
rowers. The use of the term “less-than-market rates” in the Economist quote
seems to suggest that universal banks were willing to accept expected losses
on the loans to enter the investment-banking business. However, we are not
aware of any evidence that the loans in combined deals are or were indeed un-
derpriced. Our paper shows that there are benefits to cross-selling even when
debt is correctly priced on a stand-alone basis. Moreover, cross-selling may al-
low universal banks to offer debt at a lower rate than commercial banks without
making expected losses if it is cheaper for a universal bank to offer both ser-
vices, e.g., because of economies of scope between initial debt and underwriting
services.
We provide a novel role for cross-selling above and beyond informational
economies of scope: positive effects of cross-selling may not only stem from re-
duced costs of information, but also from higher underwriting incentives. However,
cross-selling reduces the underwriter’s rent that stems from limitations of con-
tracting as debt substitutes for monetary incentives. Therefore, cross-selling is a
double-edged sword for universal banks. On the one hand, it helps them to com-
pete against specialized investment banks and may be a prerequisite for entering
the market. On the other hand, it reduces the rent to be earned in investment
banking.
Our model’s predictions are consistent with the observation that debt in com-
bined deals is often chosen by highly leveraged firms, which is confirmed
by the empirical findings of Drucker and Puri (2005). Our model also pre-
dicts that universal banks that provide combined deals are most likely to be
chosen by listed firms (SEOs) and by less innovative firms with few growth
options.
We note that in our model, cross-selling is in the interest of clients. Indeed, in the
main part of the paper, the universal bank can make two separate and unconditional
offers for the initial debt and the underwriting service. If it is optimal for the firm
to use a universal bank, it is optimal for the firm to obtain both offers from the
universal bank. The reason is that debt is correctly priced on a stand-alone basis
and the firm’s benefit of using a universal bank as underwriter stems from the
additional underwriting incentives that combining debt and underwriting services
provides. In our extension, where we consider, for example, economies of scope
between initial debt and underwriting, the universal bank’s offer may be conditional
on cross-selling. However, cross-selling is still in the interest of clients: rather than
cross-selling being forced on them, firms demand it. Hence, combined deals in our
settingdonotviolatethe“anti-tying”provisionoftheBankHoldingCompanyAct,
which prohibits a commercial bank from requiring, as a prerequisite to extending344 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
credit, that a customer must purchase additional products or services from the
bank.1
There are many studies on the potential costs and benefits of universal banks
compared to those of functionally separated investment and commercial banks.
These studies also address the concern of potential conflicts of interest associated
withuniversalbanking,whichwasaprimaryjustificationfortheGlass-SteagallAct
of 1933. Of particular relevance from the perspective of our paper is that universal
banks may have an incentive to use underwriting to rescue their shaky loans, and
that they abuse their information advantage. However, the empirical evidence on
underwriting and lending relations does not suggest that this potentially negative
effect is detrimental for the firm-bank relation.
Many empirical studies for the pre-Glass-Steagall era find higher prices (Puri,
1996) and higher long-run performance (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Puri, 1994) for
securities underwritten by banks that can provide both lending and underwriting
than securities underwritten by specialized investment banks. Gande et al. (1997)
and Schenone (2004) provide post-1990 evidence on higher prices obtained for
securities underwritten by banks with an established lending relation with the
issuer. This evidence is consistent with the assertion that firms choose a universal
bank as underwriter when the positive effect of informational economies of scope
dominates potential negative incentives.
For a theoretical discussion of the costs and benefits of universal banking see,
for example, Benston (1990), Rajan (1996), Puri (1999), Boot and Thakor (1997),
Kanatas and Qi (1998, 2003), and Ber et al. (2001). The notion that a loan can align
the interests of a firm and a bank is also discussed by Hakenes (2004). In his model,
the loan makes it credible for a bank (the risk manager) to acquire the information
needed for risk management.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we outline the model. In section
3 we explore the differences between specialized investment banks and universal
banks and present a benchmark case. We introduce cross-selling in section 4 and
analyze its role in overcoming the incentive problems of universal banks. In section
5 we discuss additional benefits of cross-selling and how these benefits affect the
choice of underwriter. In section 6 we derive the main empirical hypotheses that
emerge from our theoretical analysis. In section 7 we summarize our results. All
proofs are in the appendix.
1 SeeBHCA(1970),Sec.106(1),andJohnson(2002)foradiscussionoftheBankHoldingCompany
Act and cross-selling of credit and underwriting from a legal perspective.CROSS-SELLING LENDING AND UNDERWRITING 345
2. The Model
Weconsiderafirminarisk-neutraleconomy.Thefirmhastoraisecapitaltofinance
a new investment project. Intertwined with the investment project is a choice of
strategy, which affects the project’s expected cash flow and risk. The first-best
strategy A is not contractible and allows the firm to switch to a riskier strategy C.
Alternatively, the firm can choose strategy B, which is contractible.
For each strategy, the required initial investment is I and the project can either
succeed or fail. In the case of failure, the payoff is π. The strategies s ∈{A, B,C}
differ in their success probability qs ∈ (0,1) and payoff in the case of success
πs > π. The project’s expected payoff given strategy s is Vs ≡ π + qs(πs − π).
The risk-free rate is normalized to zero. We make the following assumptions for
the parameters of the different strategies:
1. VA > VB > I > VC
2. qA > qB > qC
3. πC > πA > πB
Strategies A and B have a positive net present value, but are mutually exclusive
because they involve different strategies to enter a market or because of a limit to
the firm’s ability to simultaneously grow and invest in different business areas, e.g.,
due to a lack of talent and frictional cost of change in the organization.
Neither strategy A nor strategy C is contractible. In contrast, strategy B is con-
tractible ex ante so that the firm can commit to implement strategy B. For example,
the firm can start at a smaller scale or choose to invest in a different business field
that involves less flexibility and where there are more tangible assets available.
Stage 1 financing: initial debt and equity to finance strategy A. Strategy A has
the highest expected payoff, but the presence of strategy C creates a potential risk-
shifting problem. If the firm does not commit to strategy B (in the debt contract), it
has the flexibility to choose either strategy A or strategy C after it takes on the debt.
For a given level of debt repayment obligation D > π, the firm will choose strategy
C rather than strategy A if qA(πA − D) < qC(πC − D). Therefore, the maximum
D for which the firm still chooses strategy A is given by
ˆ D = (qAπA − qCπC)/(qA − qC), (1)
which is strictly lower than πA. Equation (1) puts an upper bound on the amount
of debt that can be used to finance the project while retaining incentives to choose
strategy A. We assume that this level is sufficiently low so that the firm needs to
issue equity to finance strategy A.
Although it is necessary to raise equity, there are also benefits to using debt.
These benefits may, for example, result from a tax benefit of debt. The maximum346 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
debt that the firm can use is constrained by the maximum repayment obligation ˆ D.
We assume that a bank’s cost of providing the initial debt is given by k (monitoring
cost, due diligence, etc.) and that it is optimal to use as much debt as possible. Since
the risk-free rate is zero and all parties are risk neutral, a bank’s cost of funds is
zero.
In principle, the firm could choose private or public equity. There are potential
costs and benefits to both alternatives, which we do not model explicitly. Instead,
we assume that it is optimal for the firm to try a public equity issue.2
To raise equity, the firm needs an underwriter. We model the equity issue as
follows. With probability p(e), the required amount of equity can be raised at
no discount, i.e., the price equals the expected payment to equity holders. The
success probability depends on the underwriter’s effort e. The equity issue fails (is
withdrawn) with probability 1 − p(e). In the latter case no equity can be raised. For
ease of exposition, we assume that the success probability of the equity issue does
not depend on the amount of equity that needs to be raised.
It should be noted that we interpret the failure of the issue rather broadly, in-
cluding the withdrawal of the issue plans before the prospectus has been written.
Withdrawalsarerathercommon even afterprospectuseshavebeen writtenand after
theofferhasbeenfiledwiththeregulatorybody.ForallUSIPOsfiledwiththeSEC
between 1979 and 1982, Dunbar (1998) finds that 32% of all best-effort offers and
29% of all firm-commitment offers are withdrawn. Ritter (1987) obtains similar
numbers. Even with firm-commitment agreements, essentially all of the risk of
failure is borne by the issuing firm since the final commitment of the underwriter
usually takes place as late as just one day before the offer (see Ritter, 1987). There-
fore, the underwriter’s effort in marketing, information processing, and setting up
the prospectus is a primary concern for firms.
The cost of effort is c(e) = 0.5e2 and the probability of success is p(e) = αe.W e
assume that α is sufficiently low so that p(e∗) < 1. Since the firm cannot observe
the underwriting effort e, the firm must provide the underwriter with incentives.
The investment bank receives a fee w1 if the equity issue succeeds and w0 if
it fails. Equivalently, we can interpret w0 as a fixed fee, with β ≡ w1 − w0 as a
bonus if the equity issue succeeds. If it is successful, then the investment bank’s
compensation, w1 = w0 + β, is paid out of the proceeds of the equity issue.
The market for underwriting services is competitive. We assume that it is
optimal for the firm to employ an underwriter in an attempt to issue equity to
pursue strategy A.
2 Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), Mello and Parsons (2000), and Zingales (1995) provide a
theoretical analysis of the decision to go public; see also Brau and Fawcett (2006) for a recent
empirical analysis of the motives for the choice of public equity.CROSS-SELLING LENDING AND UNDERWRITING 347
Stage 2 financing: credit after a failed equity issue to finance strategy B. If the
equity issue fails, then the firm must seek an alternative source of financing. For
example, the firm might now try to raise private equity. However, private equity
could be very costly for the firm’s management or current owners who may fear
a loss of private benefits of control. We assume that it is optimal for the firm to
resort to credit if the equity issue fails. Of course, this implies that the firm now
has to commit to strategy B, which can be financed entirely with debt. (Recall that
otherwise, if the firm does not contractually commit to strategy B, it will, given
the high level of debt, choose strategy C.) Commitment to strategy B is costly
since VB < VA,w h e r eVAB ≡ VA − VB can be interpreted as the cost of commit-
ment. In addition, raising credit after a failed equity issue in a competitive market
costs c.
The underwriter: specialized investment bank versus universal bank. The firm
can choose a specialized investment bank or the investment bank branch of a
universal bank as underwriter. There are two main differences between the two
types of underwriters in our model.
First, the universal bank can provide credit if the equity issue fails. We follow
Kanatas and Qi (2003) in assuming that a universal bank that has been used as
underwriter has a cost advantage when providing the credit after a failed equity
issue,whichresultsina(quasi)renttotheuniversalbankwhenactingasunderwriter.
The cost advantage stems from informational economies of scope, as a universal
bank can economize on monitoring costs and/or relationship-building costs. We
assume that the cost saving is γc, with γ ∈ (0,1), and that the universal bank
cannot commit in stage 1 to the terms of the credit after a failed equity issue in
stage 2. As all other banks will provide credit at a cost c after a failed equity issue,
a universal bank that served as underwriter can also demand c and is therefore able
earna(quasi)rentofγc whentheequityissuefails.Alternatively,asintheliterature
on relationship-lending (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; and von Thadden, 2004), the
underwriter may gain private information that allows it to extract an information
rent when providing credit. For ease of exposition we assume that the initial lender
does not gain any information advantage.3 Moreover, in the main part of the paper
we also assume that there are no economies of scope between providing the initial
debt and underwriting services.
Second, a universal bank can provide both the initial debt and underwriting
services in the first round of financing. We refer to this case as cross-selling.
3 If the initial borrower has the same cost saving as the underwriter, Bertrand competition between
the initial borrower and the underwriter may result in zero rent after a failed equity issue. However, if
the initial borrower has a lower cost saving or if both have asymmetric information, the underwriter
may still earn an information rent based on its inside information (Rajan, 1992).348 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
The sequence of moves is as follows.
Stage 1. In this stage, the firm chooses the underwriter and raises the initial debt
with a repayment obligation ˆ D. Commercial banks that specialize in lending can
provide debt; specialized investment banks only provide underwriting services; and
universal banks can provide initial debt and/or underwriting services. We assume
that there are multiple banks of each type, which simultaneously make their offers.
Thus, the firm has complete market power. In the main part of the paper, we assume
thatthetermsofthedebtcontractcanbeconditionalonthetermsoftheunderwriting
contract.Therefore,thefirm,whenchoosingtheunderwritingcontract,internalizes
the effect of underwriting effort on the value of the initial debt and maximizes the
total firm value. We discuss and relax this assumption in section 5.2. Cross-selling
occurs if the universal bank provides both initial debt and underwriting services.
Buteveninthecaseofcross-selling,inthemainpartthepaper,weassumethateach
universal bank makes two separate offers for the initial debt and the underwriting,
which the firm can pick individually: there is no issue of potentially illegal tying.
The amount of debt, P( ˆ D,β), that a bank is willing to provide in exchange for
the promised repayment of ˆ D is a function of the underwriting bonus β. We define
P0( ˆ D,β) as the present value of a promised repayment obligation ˆ D, given the
underwriter’s effort implied by β and the firm’s optimal investment strategy. Thus,
taking into account a bank’s cost of providing initial debt, the debt is correctly
priced if P( ˆ D,β) = P0( ˆ D,β) − k.
The terms of the underwriting offer are determined by w0 and β.
Stage 2. The chosen underwriter exerts effort e, and the equity issue succeeds
with probability αe. If the equity issue succeeds, then the firm will implement
strategy A. If the equity issue fails, then the firm cannot immediately start a new
attempt to issue equity, but it can, at this stage, raise credit (additional junior debt)
at cost c to finance strategy B.
Stage 3. The project succeeds or fails. The expected payoff depends on the
strategy: strategy A after a successful equity issue and strategy B if the equity issue
fails.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events given that the firm chooses not to
commit to strategy B in the first stage.
3 e g a t S 2 e g a t S 1 e g a t S
Banks oﬀer initial debt ( ˆ D,P( ˆ D,β))
and underwriting services (w0,β)
Firm chooses lender and underwriter
Underwriter chooses e
Equity issue succeeds or fails
After success, ﬁrm implements A
After failure, ﬁrm uses credit
and commits to strategy B
Payoﬀ realized
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3. Benchmark Case: Underwriting Absent Cross-Selling
3.1 INITIAL DEBT AND THE FIRM’S OBJECTIVE
As a benchmark case, we first analyze the situation without cross-selling. Thus,
we assume that a universal bank offers only underwriting services and that the
firm obtains the initial debt from a bank that only provides debt. Thereby, we do
not preclude that a universal bank provides credit after a failed equity issue. In a
competitive market, banks will set P( ˆ D,β) = P0( ˆ D,β) − k. Thus, the firm’s cost
of initial debt is given by k.
The firm chooses the underwriting contract that maximizes the expected net
payoff to the firm’s initial equity holders (owners). This contract also maximizes
the expected firm value since, for any β, the amount of debt that the firm receives
equals the expected repayment net of the cost k. If the equity issue succeeds, the
firm will pursue strategy A and its net payoff is VA − β − w0 − k. If the equity
issue fails, the firm has to obtain credit at cost c and is forced to commit to strategy
B. Thus, in the case of failure, the firm’s net payoff is VB − c − w0 − k. In a
competitivemarket,anunderwriter’soffermaximizesthefirm’sexpectednetpayoff,
αe(VA − β) + (1 − αe)(VB − c) − w0 − k, which is equivalent to maximizing the
expected incremental net payoff, i.e.,
max
e,w0,β
αe(VAB + c − β) − w0, (2)
subject to the underwriter’s participation and incentive constraints.
3.2 UNDERWRITING WITHOUT LIMITED LIABILITY
Specialized investment bank. For a specialized investment bank, the participation
constraint and the incentive constraint are
w0 + αeβ ≥
1
2
e2 (PCi)
e = αβ, (ICi)
where the incentive constraint is given by the first-order condition for the optimal
choice of e.
w0 is determined by the investment bank’s participation constraint, which will
be binding: w0 = 1
2e2 − αeβ. We note that it is straightforward to check that w0 is
negative for any level of β. Inserting w0 and (ICi) in (2) gives us
max
β
α2β(VAB + c) −
1
2
α2β2. (3)350 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
The first-order condition for the optimal β is α2(VAB + c) − α2β = 0a n d
β = VAB + c. (4)
Inserting (4) in (3) gives the firm’s expected incremental net payoff when a special-
ized investment bank acts as underwriter:
πi =
1
2
α2(VAB + c)2. (5)
Universal bank. Instead of using a specialized investment bank, the firm might
use the investment bank branch of a universal bank as the underwriter. The main
difference is that the universal bank can provide the credit if the equity issue fails,
which results in a (quasi) rent γc, with γ ∈ (0,1). Because of this rent, a universal
bank’s participation and incentive constraints differ from those of a specialized
investment bank. These constraints are
w0 + αeβ + (1 − αe)γc ≥
1
2
e2 (PCu)
e = α(β − γc). (ICu)
The cost saving γc has two effects. First, it relaxes the investment bank’s parti-
cipation constraint. Therefore, a universal bank is ceteris paribus willing to provide
investment banking services at a lower cost than would a specialized investment
bank.Thisisapotentialpositiveeffectofeconomiesofscopebetweenunderwriting
and providing credit after a failed equity issue. Second, the cost saving reduces the
universal bank’s incentive to exert effort, as the investment bank earns the rent only
if the equity issue fails.
Again, the participation constraint is binding. Inserting w0 = 1
2e2 − αeβ − (1 −
αe)γc and (ICu) in (2) gives us
max
β
γc + α2(β − γc)(VAB + c − γc) −
1
2
α2(β − γc)2. (6)
Thefirst-orderconditionfortheoptimalβisα2(VAB + c) − α2β = 0,whichyields
β = VAB + c. (7)
Inserting (7) in (6) yields
πu = γc +
1
2
α2(VAB + c − γc)2.( 8 )
Lemma 1. When it uses a universal bank as underwriter, a firm’s expected profit
is strictly increasing in the cost saving γc after a failed equity issue.
Economiesofscopereducethecostofprovidingcreditafterafailedequityissue.
As a consequence, the benefit of a successful underwriting is lower, which implies
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specialized investment bank. By choosing β = VAB + c, the firm transfers the total
incremental benefit of a successful equity issue to the underwriter, which chooses
the first-best underwriting effort, e = α(VAB + c − γc). Without limited liability,
the firm is left with the positive information effect: the quasi rent from the expected
fee and the cost saving are ex ante transferred to the firm through a lower w0.
The choice of underwriter. Since there is no cost saving if the firm uses a special-
ized investment bank, the next proposition directly follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. Without limited liability, the universal bank dominates the spe-
cialized investment bank as underwriter.
In this setting, the firm cannot observe the underwriter’s effort, but there are
no other limits on admissible contracts. In this case, the firm will always use a
universal bank as underwriter because this saves costs and the cost saving is passed
to the firm. Thus, it is only in the presence of additional limitations on admissible
contracts that economies of scope may turn out to be a liability for the universal
bank (For example, Kanatas and Qi (2003) assume that w0 = 0).
3.3 UNDERWRITING WITH LIMITED LIABILITY
Here, we introduce limited liability and assume that w0 ≥ 0. Given the discussion
above, it is clear that in this case, it is optimal to choose w0 = 0.
Empirically, w0 ≥ 0 is prompted by the absence of up-front payments of under-
writers to their clients in practice. With limited liability, our compensation contract
resembles those observed in practice, in which underwriters receive a certain per-
centage of the proceeds of the offer (see Chen and Ritter, 2000; Hansen, 2001).
One reason for non-negative up-front payments is that they might attract firms that
stand no chance of issuing equity, but are merely trying to collect the up-front
payment.
Specialized investment bank. Substituting w0 = 0 and (ICi) in (2), the firm’s
optimization problem is given by
max
β
α2β(VAB + c − β). (9)
The first-order condition for the optimal β is α2[VAB + c − β] − α2β = 0a n d
β =
1
2
(VAB + c). (10)352 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
Substituting (10) in (9) gives the firm’s expected incremental net payoff when a
specialized investment bank acts as underwriter:
πi =
α2
4
(VAB + c)2. (11)
Universal bank. Substituting w0 = 0 and (ICu) in (2) yields
max
β
α2(β − γc)(VAB + c − γc − β). (12)
The first-order condition for the optimal β is VAB + c − 2β = 0, which yields
β =
1
2
(VAB + c). (13)
Inserting (13) in (12), we obtain
πu =
α2
4
(VAB + c − γc)2. (14)
The choice of underwriter. The universal bank is preferred if πu > πi,w h i c hi s
never satisfied.
Proposition 2. With limited liability, the firm will never choose the underwriting
services of a universal bank absent cross-selling.
Absent cross-selling, because of the negative incentive effect of the cost saving
after a failed equity issue, universal banks cannot enter the underwriting business.
Because of limited liability, the cost saving γc cannot be transferred to the firm,
leavingthefirmexposedtoonlythenegativeeffectoflowerunderwritingincentives.
It is costly to offset this negative effect by increasing β, because increasing β
increases the universal bank’s rent. Therefore, when it uses a universal bank as
underwriter, the firm’s expected profit is strictly decreasing in the cost saving γc.
4. Cross-Selling Lending and Underwriting
We now examine the role of cross-selling, i.e., universal banks offer both the initial
debt and the underwriting services to the firm. To break even, the total expected
net payoff from the loan and the underwriting business must not be lower than the
cost of underwriting effort.
If we allow universal banks to freely choose P( ˆ D,β) subject to the overall
participation constraint, then the debt can serve as a pure rent extraction instrument
to overcome the limited liability constraint on w0: providing loss-making debt to
the firm to win in the underwriting business is akin to paying an entry fee w0 < 0.
Thus, we are back to the case without limited liability where a universal bank
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be needed: what is the benefit of using debt to make a transfer to the firm instead
of using w0? If there are reasons to assume that it is not optimal for underwriters to
pay an entry fee in the underwriting business, it is also reasonable to assume that it
is not optimal to use loss-making debt as a back-door entry fee.
We are interested in whether cross-selling can play a role above and beyond
the pure transfer of rents through initial debt. Therefore, we continue to assume
that the initial debt is priced correctly on a stand-alone basis so that P( ˆ D,β) =
P0( ˆ D,β) − k. Moreover, we assume that universal banks make two separate offers
for the initial debt and the underwriting service.
When we examine the role of combined deals in which universal banks offer
both the initial debt and the underwriting services to the firm, the effect of the
underwriting success on the value of the debt is important. If the equity issue
succeeds,thenthevalueofthedebtclaimisπ + qA( ˆ D − π).Iftheequityissuefails,
thefirmpursuesstrategy B andthevalueofdebtisπ + qB( ˆ D − π).Therefore,with
a successful equity issue, the debt value increases by ˆ δ = (qA − qB)( ˆ D − π). For
this reason, with cross-selling, risky debt provides the underwriter with incentives
to issue equity. Thus, a universal bank’s incentive constraint is now given by e =
α(β − γc + ˆ δ).
We note that ˆ δ equals the expected increase in the firm’s debt value if the equity
issue is successful. A prerequisite for ˆ δ to be positive is that the outstanding debt
is risky, i.e., ˆ D > π, and switching to strategy B increases the default probability,
i.e., qA > qB. ˆ δ is higher for firms with higher leverage, as measured by ˆ D.
Cross-selling also affects a universal bank’s participation constraint. Risky debt
provides the universal bank with incentives to exert effort. Of course, to break even,
the bank has to be compensated for this effort. Given P( ˆ D,β) = P0( ˆ D,β) − k,
the terms of the debt do not include this compensation. However, the expected
underwriting bonus and the future rent from a loan after a failed equity issue
may be sufficiently high to cover these costs. If the expected underwriting bonus
and the future rent are not high enough, the universal bank has to receive a fixed
underwriting fee. Thus, w0 > 0 is now possible.
With cross-selling, the underwriting contract maximizes (2) subject to
w0 + αeβ + (1 − αe)γc ≥
1
2
e2 (PCcs
u )
e = α(β − γc + ˆ δ) (ICcs
u )
w0 ≥ 0. (15)
We substitute (ICcs
u )i n( P C cs
u ) and rearrange terms to obtain
w0 ≥   ≡
1
2
α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)2 − γc − α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)(β − γc) (16)354 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
for future reference. We note that without limited liability, the firm optimally
chooses w0 =   and (PCcs
u ) is always binding. This case would be equivalent to the
case that we discussed in section 3.2 where the universal bank always dominates
a specialized investment bank: there is no benefit of cross-selling. Here, we are
interested in the case with limited liability. With limited liability, there are three
possibilitiesgiventheoptimalchoiceofβ.First,theparticipationconstraintisbind-
ing, but not the limited liability constraint. Second, the limited liability constraint
is binding, but not the participation constraint. Third, both constraints are binding.
We now derive the optimal solutions for the three cases.
Limited liability constraint is not binding. We first consider the relaxed problem
and ignore the limited liability constraint, i.e., w0 =  . Substituting w0 and (ICcs
u )
into (2), we obtain
max
β
α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)(VAB + c − γc) −
1
2
α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)2 + γc. (17)
Thefirstorderconditionforβyieldsα2(VAB + c − γc) − α2(β − γc + ˆ δ) = 0,and
hence,
β = VAB + c − ˆ δ. (18)
Given (18), e = α(VAB + c − γc) and the universal bank chooses the first-best
underwriting effort.
Our next step is to check whether the limited liability constraint is indeed not
binding, i.e., whether   ≥ 0f o rβ = VAB + c − ˆ δ. Plugging (18) into (16) gives
us w0 ≥  LL ≡ 1
2α2(VAB + c − γc)2 − γc − α2(VAB + c − γc)(VAB + c − γc −
ˆ δ). Thus, the limited liability constraint is non-binding and w0 =  LL if
 LL =−
1
2
α2(VAB + c − γc)(VAB + c − γc − 2ˆ δ) − γc ≥ 0. (19)
Lemma2. Thereexistsacritical ¯ δLL ≤ VABsothatthelimitedliabilityconstraint
is binding for ˆ δ < ¯ δLL and non-binding for ˆ δ ∈ [¯ δLL,VAB).I fˆ δ ∈ [¯ δLL,VAB),t h e n
a universal bank chooses the first-best underwriting effort given cross-selling.
If ˆ δ is high, then cross-selling gives the underwriter strong incentives to provide
effort, which also results in high effort cost for the underwriter. Hence, it is optimal
for the firm to use a low-powered incentive scheme with a low β, but a positive
fixed fee to compensate the universal bank for the underwriting effort that the debt
induces. It arises if ˆ δ ∈ [¯ δLL,VAB), but this case is only possible if ¯ δLL < VAB.
Given ˆ δ ≥ ¯ δLL, substituting (18) in (17) yields
πcs
u = γc +
α2
2
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For ˆ δ ≥ ¯ δLL, ˆ δ has no effect on the expected incremental net payoff. The reason
is that if the limited liability constraint is non-binding, then ˆ δ and β are perfect
substitutes: if ˆ δ increases, then the optimal β in (18) decreases by the same amount.
Nevertheless, the debt’s risk is not irrelevant. A sufficiently high ˆ δ is a prerequisite
for the limited liability constraint to be non-binding: the firm can obtain the same
expected incremental profit as in our benchmark case without limited liability and
without cross-selling, which is given by (8).
Limited liability constraint is binding. If (19) is not satisfied, then the limited
liability constraint is binding. In this case, it is optimal to choose w0 = 0. Without
cross-selling, w0 = 0 always implies that the underwriter earns a rent and the
underwriter’s participation constraint is not binding. The reason is that in this case
all incentives stem from β, which is more than sufficient to cover the effort cost.
Withcross-selling,incentivesstemfromdebtandβ,sothatboththelimitedliability
constraint and the participation constraint may be binding.
Wefirstconsidertherelaxedproblem,ignoring,forthemoment,theparticipation
constraint. Substituting (ICcs
u )a n dw0 = 0 in (2) yields
max
β
α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)(VAB + c − β). (21)
The first-order condition for the optimal choice of β is given by α2(VAB + c − β) −
α2(β − γc + ˆ δ) = 0. Rearranging terms yields
β =
1
2
(VAB + c + γc − ˆ δ). (22)
Wenowcheckwhether(PCcs
u )issatisfied,whichisthecaseif  ≤ 0 fortheoptimal
β in (22). Substituting (22) and w0 = 0 into (16) gives us
0 ≥  PC ≡−
1
8
α2(VAB + c − γc + ˆ δ)(VAB + c − γc − 3ˆ δ) − γc. (23)
Lemma 3. There exists a critical ¯ δPC ∈ (γc, ¯ δLL] so that (PCcs
u ) is non-binding if
ˆ δ ≤ ¯ δPC and binding if ˆ δ > ¯ δPC. A universal bank does not earn a rent if ˆ δ ≥ ¯ δPC.
For low-risk debt, incentives from debt are low. Thus, the firm still chooses a
high β, which results in a rent for the universal bank if ˆ δ < ¯ δPC.A sˆ δ increases,
the firm reduces β only by 0.5ˆ δ, so that total underwriting incentives increase in ˆ δ.
Given ˆ δ ≤ ¯ δPC, we obtain the firm’s marginal expected profit by substituting (22)
in (21):
πcs
u =
1
4
α2(VAB + c + ˆ δ − γc)2. (24)
We note that ¯ δPC = ¯ δLL in Lemma 3 can only arise if ¯ δLL = VAB. In this case,
the universal bank’s participation constraint is never binding.356 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
For ¯ δPC < ˆ δ < ¯ δLL, the participation constraint and the limited liability con-
straint are both binding, and the optimal β is determined by   = 1
2α2(β − γc +
ˆ δ)2 − γc − α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)(β − γc) = 0s ot h a t
β = γc +

ˆ δ2 −
2γc
α2 . (25)
Equation (25) is derived in the appendix.
The choice of underwriter. The firm chooses a universal bank if πcs
u − πi > 0,
where πi is given by (11).
Proposition 3. With cross-selling,
(i) πcs
u is strictly increasing in ˆ δ for ˆ δ < ¯ δLL and reaches the first-best level for
ˆ δ ≥ ¯ δLL.
(ii) For ˆ δ < γc, a specialized investment bank dominates a universal bank.
(iii) For ˆ δ = γc, the firm is indifferent.
(iv) For ˆ δ > γc, a universal bank dominates a specialized investment bank.
ˆ δ
Investment bank   
Universal bank with cross-selling
  
0 γc δPC δLL VAB
  
LLC binding
  
LLC non-binding
  
PC non-binding
  
PC binding
Figure 2. Three possible cases
Figure2illustratesthethreecasesdiscussedaboveandtheresultsinProposition3.
In the figure we assume that ¯ δPC < ¯ δLL < VAB so that all three cases may be
possible,butitshouldbenotedthat ¯ δPC ≤ ¯ δLL = VABisalsopossible.Forexample,
for ¯ δPC = ¯ δLL = VABthelasttworegionsinfigure2vanishandtheuniversalbank’s
participation constraint is non-binding for all possible ˆ δ. However, the existence
of these regions is not crucial for the choice of underwriter: The critical threshold
for ˆ δ that determines whether a universal bank with cross-selling or a specialized
investment bank is used as underwriter, γc, always lies in the region where ˆ δ < ¯ δPC
and where the universal bank’s participation constraint is non-binding.
Theincentiveeffect of cross-sellingincreasesin ˆ δ, which reduces the bank’s rent.
Indeed, if ˆ δ > ˆ δPC, then the bank’s participation constraint is binding. Moreover, if
ˆ δ increases further, then the limited liability constraint may no longer be binding if
ˆ δ ≥ ˆ δLL. The firm’s expected incremental profit strictly increases in ˆ δ for ˆ δ < ¯ δLL.CROSS-SELLING LENDING AND UNDERWRITING 357
If ˆ δ ≥ ¯ δLL,thelimitedliabilityconstraintisnotbindingandthefirmcanimplement
the first-best solution.
Absent cross-selling, the firm will never choose the universal bank with limited
liability (see Proposition 2). With ˆ δ < γc, the incentive effect from cross-selling is
not sufficient to compensate for the negative effect that stems from the universal
bank’s ability to earn a rent after failure of the equity issue. In this case, the
universalbank’sintrinsicnetunderwritingorimplicitincentives ˆ δ − γcarenegative.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the firm to choose a universal bank is that
ˆ δ exceeds γc, so that the universal bank’s intrinsic incentives are positive. Thus,
highly leveraged borrowers are more likely to choose a universal bank.
Since debt is priced correctly on a stand-alone basis, universal banks can offer
both contracts separately without forcing the firm to take either both or none. But
of course they offer both contracts at the conditions above only if ˆ δ ≥ γc so that it
is optimal for the firm to choose a universal bank with cross-selling.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the presence of limited liability and cost saving of providing
credit after a failed equity issue,
(i) cross-selling is a prerequisite for universal banks to enter the investment
banking business,
(ii) cross-selling increases an underwriter’s incentives,
(iii) cross-selling is particularly effective for firms with high leverage,
(iv) cross-selling reduces a universal bank’s rent in the underwriting business.
5. Extensions
5.1 ECONOMIES OF SCOPE BETWEEN UNDERWRITING AND INITIAL DEBT
Ofcourse,informationaleconomiesofscopebetweenunderwritingandlendingmay
alsoexistbetweenunderwritingandinitialdebt.Here,weconsidertheconsequences
if economies of scope lead to lower costs of providing initial debt. We assume that
the universal bank’s cost of providing the initial debt with cross-selling is ˆ k < k.
Hence, the universal bank can provide initial debt in combined deals at a lower rate
than commercial banks that only provide debt and still make no loss on the debt,
i.e., P( ˆ D,β) = P0( ˆ D,β) − ˆ k. Thus, when compared to the terms of stand-alone
credits, the debt in combined deals is offered at a less-than-market rate.4 However,
the reason is not to lure firms into choosing a universal bank as underwriter, but
4 We assume that the firm adjusts the equity issue so that the total debt and equity proceeds continue
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the force of competition between universal banks and the presence of economies of
scope between initial debt and underwriting.
Because of the lower cost of initial debt, using a universal bank as underwriter
andcross-sellinghasacostadvantageofk − ˆ k > 0comparedtousingaspecialized
investment bank. If ˆ δ > γc, then the cost advantage has no effect on the choice of
underwriter, since in this case, the universal bank already dominates a specialized
investment bank even absent the cost advantage. However, the cost advantage may
affect the choice of underwriter if ˆ δ < γc, since the universal bank may now be
chosen as underwriter. This requires that the universal bank can make a conditional
offer where the terms of the debt depend on the firm also choosing its underwriting
service.
We note that this type of bundling of initial debt and underwriting services
is in the interest of the firm (consumer). Hence, bundling services and offering
this bundle at a lower price is not prohibited by the anti-tying provision of the
Bank Holding Company Act since the bundle is not forced onto the firm but
chosen voluntarily.5 In the absence of such bundling the firm would consider the
two products independently and, for ˆ δ < γc, combine the low-cost debt from a
universal bank with the underwriting services of a specialized investment bank.
Proposition 5. Given economies of scope between underwriting and initial debt
(ˆ k < k), a universal bank can offer initial debt at a less-than-market rate with
cross-selling.
(i) Thereexistsacritical ˆ δk < γc,atwhichthefirmisindifferentbetweenunder-
writers. If ˆ δ < ˆ δk, then the firm chooses an investment bank as underwriter.
If ˆ δ > ˆ δk, then the firm chooses a universal bank with cross-selling.
(ii) For ˆ δ < γc a universal bank is more likely to be chosen the lower are VAB
and α.
If ˆ δ < γc, the cost benefit, k − ˆ k, must overcompensate for the negative net
intrinsic incentives, which are more severe if the cost of commitment, VAB,a n d
5 For example, in the most recent and binding interpretation of the relevant section 106 of the Bank
HoldingCompanyAct(BHCA),theFederalreservestates:“Evenifaconditionorrequirementexists
tying the customer’s desired product to another product, a violation of section 106 may occur only if
the condition or requirement was imposed or forced on the customer by the bank. ...It was not the
purpose of the statute to prohibit bank customers from using their own bargaining power to obtain
a package of desired products from a bank and its affiliates or a price discount on those products.
Similarly, it was not the purpose of the statute to prohibit customers from voluntarily seeking and
obtaining multiple products that the customer desires from a bank or its affiliates.” (see Federal
Reserve System, 2004, p. 14). In a similar manner, Johnson (2002) states that courts required a
damage to the customer in order to establish a violation of the anti-tying provisions of the BHCA. If
there are no specific anti-tying provisions for the banking industry as in the US, the general anti-tying
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the productivity of the underwriter, α, are high. Hence, given negative intrinsic net
underwriting incentives, the firm is more likely to choose a universal bank if VAB
and α are low. If the intrinsic net underwriting incentives ˆ δ − γc are positive, then
the universal bank always wins out over a specialized investment bank. Thus, in
this case, VAB and α have no effect on the choice of underwriter.
5.2 DEBT OVERHANG PROBLEM AND UNDERWRITING INCENTIVES
Sofar,wehaveassumedthatthetermsoftheinitialdebtareconditionalontheterms
of the underwriting contract so that the firm chooses the underwriting contract that
maximizes the total firm value. We now discuss the implications of this assumption
in greater detail. If the terms of the initial debt are not conditional on the underwrit-
ing contract, given limited liability of equity holders and the (fixed) terms of the
initial debt, β is chosen to maximize the expected incremental benefit of underwrit-
ing to equity, αe(VAB − ˆ δ + c − β), instead of the incremental benefit to the firm,
αe(VAB + c − β). Thus, there is a debt overhang problem in the choice of β: equity
holdersbearthefullcostofunderwriting,butdebtholdersreapsomeofthebenefits.
Debt holders anticipate the firm’s equilibrium choice of β, βe, and price their debt
correctly so that P( ˆ D,βe) = P0( ˆ D,βe) − k continues to hold in equilibrium. But
P0( ˆ D,βe) is now lower for any level of ˆ D. (If the terms of the initial debt depend on
β, the debt is priced correctly for every possible β, and not only for the equilibrium
choice βe.)
To analyze the debt overhang problem, we consider the case of a specialized
investment bank. The firm chooses the underwriting contract that maximizes the
incremental benefit of underwriting to equity given ˆ D and therefore ˆ δ. The opti-
mization problem is given by
max
β
αe(VAB − ˆ δ + c − β) (26)
subject to the incentive constraint of the investment bank, e = αβ. Substituting e
intotheobjectivefunctionleadstoα2β(VAB − ˆ δ + c − β).Maximizingwithrespect
to β gives us
β =
1
2
(VAB − ˆ δ + c), (27)
which banks anticipate in equilibrium so that (27) also determines βe. The expected
incremental payoff to equity holders is
πD
i =
α2
4
[VAB + c − ˆ δ][VAB + c + ˆ δ] =
α2
4
[(VAB + c)2 − ˆ δ2]. (28)
Giventhetermsoftheinitialdebt,itisoptimalfortheequityholderstoignorethe
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terms of the debt and the underwriting terms are chosen simultaneously, the spe-
cialized investment banks will offer underwriting contracts that do not consider the
impact of β on the value of the debt and for which β is inefficiently low. Hence, in
addition to the distortion introduced by limited liability of the underwriter, we now
also have a distortion due to the debt overhang problem, which reduces underwrit-
ing incentives even further. The banks that provide the initial debt anticipate the
firm’s choice of underwriter. Thus, the cost of the debt overhang problem is borne
by the firm’s equity holders. One possibility around this problem is that the firm
signs the underwriting contract with the specialized investment bank first and then
takes on the debt. However, if this is not possible, there may be another benefit of
a universal bank.
A universal bank can help to overcome the debt overhang problem. As in
subsection 5.1 we assume that the universal bank provides – in the interest of
firms – bundled deals where the debt is priced conditional on the firm ob-
taining both the initial debt and the underwriting services from the firm. By
bundling the initial debt and the underwriting services, the universal bank can
help the firm’s equity holders to overcome the debt overhang problem. The reason
is that by choosing the bundled contracts, the firm is committing to the terms
of the underwriting contract, i.e., a higher β, when choosing the initial debt.
The firm’s equity holders benefit by this commitment in the form of a higher
P0( ˆ D) that reflects the higher underwriting incentives. Avoiding the debt over-
hang problem can be an additional benefit of using a universal bank and a rea-
son for why a universal bank may dominate a specialized investment bank even
if ˆ δ < γc.
Proposition 6. Assume that there is a debt overhang problem of initial debt on
underwriting incentives in the case of a specialized investment bank, but not in the
case of a universal bank with cross-selling. Then:
(i) There exists a critical ˆ δD < γc so that the firm chooses a universal bank if
ˆ δ > ˆ δD, and an investment bank if ˆ δ < ˆ δD.
(ii) For ˆ δ < γc, a universal bank is more likely to be chosen the lower is VAB.
Bundling avoids the debt overhang problem so that the firm provides higher
underwriting incentives when it chooses a universal bank. Therefore, the proba-
bility of success is higher and, ceteris paribus, the risk of the debt is lower, and
the interest rate implied by P( ˆ D) = P0( ˆ D) − k is also lower with cross-selling
than without cross-selling. If ˆ δ < γc, then the benefit of overcoming the debt
overhang problem through bundling must overcompensate the negative net intrin-
sic incentives. The debt overhang problem is more severe if the cost of commit-
ment, VAB, is high, and the firm is more likely to choose a universal bank if VAB
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6. Empirical Implications
A first set of empirical predictions emerges from the main body of our analysis
in section 4. First, universal banks, which provide combined deals, are more likely
to be chosen by firms with high levels of risky debt held by the underwriting
bank (high ˆ δ) (see Proposition 4). Second, cross-selling is more likely to occur in
situationsinwhichtheeconomiesofscopebetweenunderwritingandlendinginthe
case of failure of the equity issue are sufficiently low (low γ) (see Proposition 3).
Third, cross-selling leads to fiercer competition and lower rents in the underwriting
business (see Proposition 4). To make our research more accessible to empirical
analysis, in what follows we elaborate on some of our empirical predictions.
Since ˆ δdirectlyincreasesin ˆ D,ouranalysisleadsustoexpectthatfirmswithhigh
leverage are the most likely to be clients of universal banks that act as underwriters
and use combined deals. This hypothesis is confirmed by Drucker and Puri (2005).
After a failed equity issue, a universal bank will earn a high rent from the
credit if there are pronounced informational economies of scope and/or a high level
of asymmetric information between the underwriter and outside creditors. When
providing credit, an intermediary incurs the cost of (i) establishing a customer
relationship, (ii) evaluating the existing operations, and (iii) evaluating the new
investment opportunity. The underwriter does not have to incur the costs (i) and (ii)
again, which implies that informational economies of scope are large if the costs
(i) and (ii) are relatively high. Public information reduces informational economies
of scope and the degree of informational asymmetries. Therefore, the rent from
a failed equity issue is lower for listed firms than for privately owned firms,
and lower for rated firms than for non-rated firms. Universal banks dominate
specialized investment banks if the rent is sufficiently small (i.e., if ˆ δ > γc)s ot h a t
universal banks using combined deals are likely to act as underwriters for firms
that are already listed, i.e., for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and which already
have a rating. In contrast, privately owned firms that want to pursue initial public
offerings (IPOs), and which usually do not have a rating, are more likely to choose
a specialized investment bank.
The prediction about the choice of underwriter by rated and non-rated firms
is consistent with recent empirical evidence by Parthasarathy (2007), who finds
that when choosing an equity underwriter, unrated firms value specialized skills in
the lending and underwriting business and only infrequently choose cross-selling,
compared to rated firms.
Our paper complements Fernando et al. (2005). These authors show that more
reputable underwriters underwrite issues of firms with lower uncertainty and lower
asymmetricinformationormonitoringneeds.Weassumethatunderwritershavethe
same reputation, but differ with respect to their ability to provide credit in addition
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between 1970 and 2000, their sample primarily comprises specialized investment
banks. It would be interesting to test for the effect of the type of underwriter,
specialized investment bank or universal bank, for the matching between firms and
underwriters.
A further set of empirical predictions results from our extensions in section 5:
If cross-selling has advantages in addition to the pure incentive effect, our model
predicts that universal banks are chosen for a larger set of parameters, and universal
banks will offer initial debt at a less-than-market rate in combined deals and are
more likely to be chosen if the expected loss in value due to commitment to strategy
B is low (low VAB) (see Propositions 5 and 6).
Our extension in section 5.1 reveals the importance of distinguishing between
different types of informational economies of scope, as discussed in the introduc-
tion,andtheirimpactontheroleofcross-selling.Informationaleconomiesofscope
between underwriting and credit after a failed equity issue reduce universal banks’
underwriting incentives, and cross-selling is important to enter the underwriting
business. But the initial debt’s risk in cross-selling has to be sufficiently high rela-
tive to the rent after a failed equity issue to overcome the negative incentive effect.
Informational economies of scope between underwriting and initial debt provide
another motive for cross-selling, in addition to the positive incentive effect. Thus,
ceteris paribus, a universal bank is more likely to be chosen if the economies of
scope between underwriting and initial debt are large.
The cost of commitment is higher for firms with high benefits of remaining
flexible, high growth options, few tangible assets, and greater benefits of starting
at a large scale. Therefore, the cost of commitment should be high for innova-
tive firms with superior technological knowledge, which can lead to high growth
potentials, and which have few tangible assets. In contrast, commitment is likely
to be less costly for firms operating in mature industries with little growth po-
tential and pronounced tangible assets. Therefore, our analysis predicts that firms
in mature industries with few growth options and with a large proportion of tan-
gible assets should choose universal banks as underwriters. These are also the
firms that are more likely to be already listed, and to raise money through a
SEO.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we examine a particular aspect of the expansion of universal banks’
activities into investment banking: the ability of universal banks to cross-sell lend-
ing and underwriting. This phenomenon has occurred with increasing frequency
in the last decade. Our theoretical framework makes it possible for us to inves-
tigate different aspects of this phenomenon, and to shed light on the underlyingCROSS-SELLING LENDING AND UNDERWRITING 363
mechanisms and reasons for cross-selling as well as on the consequences of cross-
selling for the parties involved.
Universal banks face a dilemma when entering the underwriting business. Al-
though informational economies of scope between underwriting and lending can
reducethecostofraisingcapital,theycanalsoreduceincentivesintheunderwriting
business. We show that cross-selling lending and underwriting can help to resolve
this incentive problem and enable universal banks to compete against specialized
investment banks. However, in combined deals, holding risky debt in the firms
they underwrite also reduces universal banks’ rent compared to specialized invest-
ment banks. Hence, cross-selling turns out to be a mixed blessing, since it allows
universal banks to enter the underwriting markets only at the cost of fiercer price
competition and lower overall profitability.
On the basis of our main model, we expect that universal banks are more likely to
bechosenasunderwritersforSEOsbylessinnovativefirmswithhighleverage,and
that specialized investment banks are more likely to underwrite IPOs of innovative
start-ups or the SEOs of growth firms.
Although we focus on equity underwriting, the benefit of combined deals is
also present for other investment-banking services whenever the quality of the
investment-banking service affects the value of the client’s outstanding debt. Ex-
amples include corporate restructuring and mergers and acquisitions where the
quality of advice affects not only a firm’s outstanding equity, but also its risky debt
positions.
Appendix
This appendix contains the formal proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. ∂πu
∂γc = 1 − α2(VAB + c − γc) > 0 since the probability of a
successful equity issue is αe = α2(VAB + c − γc) < 1f o rβ = VAB + c. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Define ˆ δLL as the ˆ δ for which  LL = 0. Since ∂ LL
∂ˆ δ =
α2(VAB + c − γc) > 0,  LL > 0f o rˆ δ > ˆ δLL and  LL < 0f o rˆ δ < ˆ δLL. ˆ δLL
may exceed VAB,b u tˆ δ is strictly lower than VAB. We thus obtain ¯ δLL ≡
min{ˆ δLL,VAB}. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Define ˆ δPC as  PC =− 1
8α2(VAB + c − γc + ˆ δPC)(VAB +
c − γc − 3ˆ δPC) − γc = 0. Since ∂ PC
∂ˆ δ = 2
8α2(VAB + c − γc + 3ˆ δ) > 0, we obtain
 PC ≤ 0i fˆ δ ≤ ˆ δPC and  PC > 0i fˆ δ > ˆ δPC. We first show that ˆ δPC > γc.I na
second step, we prove that ˆ δPC < ˆ δLL.364 CHRISTIAN LAUX AND UWE WALZ
A sufficient condition for   ≤ 0i sα2(β − γc + ˆ δ)β ≥ 1
2α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)2 (see
Equation (16)). Rearranging terms yields β ≥ ˆ δ − γc, which is always satisfied
if ˆ δ ≤ γc since β ≥ 0. Thus, (PCcs
u ) is always non-binding for ˆ δ ≤ γc. Hence,
ˆ δPC > γc.
To show that ˆ δPC < ˆ δLL, we first note that ˆ δPC and ˆ δLL are de-
fined such that  PC = 0a n d LL = 0 given the optimal βs, (22) and
(18) respectively. β is strictly higher for ˆ δLL than for ˆ δPC since, taking
the difference between (18) and (22), VAB + c − ˆ δ − 0.5(VAB + c + γc − ˆ δ) =
0.5(VAB + c − γc − ˆ δ) > 0. Furthermore, d  = [α2(β − γc + ˆ δ) − α2(β − γc) −
α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)]dβ + [α2(β − γc + ˆ δ) − α2(β − γc)]dˆ δ = 0 and hence d  =

−α2(β − γc)

dβ + [α2ˆ δ]dˆ δ = 0. Therefore,
dβ
dˆ δ =
ˆ δ
β−γc. To show that
dβ
dˆ δ > 0, we
first note that
dβ
dˆ δ is continuous. We define β(ˆ δ)a st h eβ for which   = 0g i v e nˆ δ.
For an arbitrarily low ˆ δ,i fβ(ˆ δ) > γc,t h e n
dβ
dˆ δ > 0a n dβ(ˆ δ) increases in ˆ δ;a n di f
β(ˆ δ) < γc,t h e n
dβ
dˆ δ < 0a n dβ(ˆ δ) decreases in ˆ δ. Thus, assume that
dβ
dˆ δ < 0, this is
true for all β and β never exceeds γc. However, for ˆ δLL we obtain β = VAB + c − ˆ δ,
which exceeds γc since VAB + c − γc − ˆ δ > 0 and therefore contradicts the as-
sumption. Hence,
dβ
dˆ δ > 0s ot h a tβ > γc and ˆ δPC < ˆ δLL.
As a last step we note that ˆ δPC may exceed VAB,b u tˆ δ is strictly lower than VAB.
We thus obtain ¯ δPC ≡ min{ˆ δPC,VAB}. 
Proof of Equation (25). Equation (25) is obtained from rearranging   =
1
2α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)2 − γc − α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)(β − γc) = 0, which yields (β − γc)2 =
ˆ δ2 −
2γc
α2 . We first note that ˆ δ2 >
2γc
α2 for ˆ δ ∈ (¯ δPC, ¯ δLL) since, using (23),
we get α2
8

(VAB + c − γc − ¯ δPC)2 − 4¯ δ2
PC

+ γc = 0 and therefore ¯ δ2
PC =
2γc
α2 +
(VAB+c−γc−¯ δPC)2
4 >
2γc
α2 . Hence, ˆ δ2 >
2γc
α2 for ˆ δ > ¯ δPC. Moreover, since β > γc (see
proof of Lemma 3), β is given by γc +

ˆ δ2 −
2γc
α2 . 
ProofofProposition3.(i)For ˆ δ ≤ ¯ δPC,πcs
u isgivenbyEquation(24)andstrictly
increasing in ˆ δ. In the following we show that πcs
u is also strictly increasing in ˆ δ
for ˆ δ ∈ (¯ δPC, ¯ δLL). Since πcs
u = α2(β − γc + ˆ δ)(VAB + c − β), we obtain
∂πcs
u
∂ˆ δ =
α2[(
dβ
dˆ δ + 1)(VAB + c − β) − (β − γc + ˆ δ)
dβ
dˆ δ], which is positive if
dβ
dˆ δ(VAB + c −
β − (β − γc) − ˆ δ) + (VAB + c − β) > 0.Ifwesubstitute
dβ
dˆ δ =
ˆ δ
β−γc (fromtheproof
ofLemma3)andrearrangeterms,weobtain
ˆ δ
β−γc(VAB + c − β − ˆ δ) + (VAB + c −
β − ˆ δ) > 0. Since
ˆ δ
β−γc > 0, the condition is satisfied if β < VAB + c − ˆ δ, which
holdssinceβ = VAB + c − ˆ δwouldinducethefirstbesteffort,whichisnotoptimal
for the firm to implement given that the limited liability constraint is binding for
ˆ δ ∈ (¯ δPC, ¯ δLL).CROSS-SELLING LENDING AND UNDERWRITING 365
(ii) With ˆ δ < γc,( P C cs
u ) is non-binding and the firm’s profits in case of cross-
selling is given by (24). Hence, πcs
u − πi = α2
4 [(VAB + c + ˆ δ − γc)2 − (VAB +
c)2] < 0f o rˆ δ < γc.
(iii) With ˆ δ = γc, we obtain πcs
u = πi.
(iv)Withγc < ˆ δ < ¯ δPC,(24)appliesagain.Usingourargumentsfrom(i)reveals
that πcs
u > πi in this case. If ˆ δ > ¯ δPC firm’s profits are even larger than in (24)
implying again πcs
u > πi. 
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) The firm will choose the universal bank if   ≡
πcs
u − πi + k − ˆ k > 0. We have to analyze the choice of underwriter for ˆ δ < γc
since the universal bank already dominates a universal bank for ˆ k = k if ˆ δ > γc
and ˆ k < k increases the benefit of using a universal bank. For ˆ δ < γc,πcs
u is given
by (24) and we obtain  1 = 1
4α2(VAB + c + ˆ δ − γc)2 − 1
4α2(VAB + c)2 + k − ˆ k.
Setting   equal to zero allows us to define
ˆ δa ≡

(VAB + c)2 +
4
α2(ˆ k − k) − (VAB + c) + γc < γc.
We note that (VAB + c)2 + 4
α2(ˆ k − k) > 0s i n c e1
4α2(VAB + c)2 − c > 0, which is
a necessary condition for the equity issue to be optimal. Since ∂ /∂ˆ δ > 0,πcs
u −
πi > 0f o rˆ δ > ˆ δa and πcs
u − πi < 0f o rˆ δ < ˆ δa.H o w e v e r ,a sˆ δa may be negative,
but ˆ δ > 0, we define ˆ δk ≡ max{0, ˆ δa}.
(ii) This follows from ∂ˆ δa/∂VAB > 0a n d∂ˆ δa/∂α > 0. 
ProofofProposition6.Thefirmchoosestheuniversalbankif 2 ≡ πcs
u − πD
i =
α2
4 [(VAB + c + ˆ δ − γc)2 − (VAB + c − ˆ δ)(VAB + c + ˆ δ)] > 0. Define ˆ δD so that
 2(ˆ δD) = 0.
(i)Since∂ 2/∂ˆ δ > 0and 2(ˆ δ = γc) > 0,weobtain ˆ δD < γc,  2 < 0ifˆ δ < ˆ δD,
and  2 > 0i fˆ δ > ˆ δD.
(ii) Since ∂ 2/∂ˆ δ > 0a n d∂ 2/∂VAB = α2
2 (ˆ δ − γc) < 0f o rˆ δ = ˆ δD,
∂ˆ δD/∂VAB =−
∂ 2(ˆ δD)/∂VAB
∂ 2/∂ˆ δ
> 0.
Furthermore, since ∂ 2(ˆ δD)/∂α = 0,∂ˆ δD/∂α = 0. 
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